Framing Non-Whites and Producing Second-Class Citizens in France and Portugal by Reiter, Bernd
University of South Florida
Scholar Commons
Government and International Affairs Faculty
Publications Government and International Affairs
2012
Framing Non-Whites and Producing Second-Class
Citizens in France and Portugal
Bernd Reiter
University of South Florida, breiter@usf.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/gia_facpub
Part of the Government Contracts Commons, and the International Relations Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Government and International Affairs at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Government and International Affairs Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information,
please contact scholarcommons@usf.edu.
Scholar Commons Citation
Reiter, Bernd, "Framing Non-Whites and Producing Second-Class Citizens in France and Portugal" (2012). Government and
International Affairs Faculty Publications. 7.
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/gia_facpub/7
University of South Florida
Scholar Commons
Government and International Affairs Faculty
Publications Government and International Affairs
2012
Framing Non-Whites and Producing Second-Class
Citizens in France and Portugal
Bernd Reiter
University of South Florida, breiter@usf.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/gia_facpub
Part of the Government Contracts Commons, and the International Relations Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Government and International Affairs at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Government and International Affairs Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information,
please contact scholarcommons@usf.edu.
Scholar Commons Citation
Reiter, Bernd, "Framing Non-Whites and Producing Second-Class Citizens in France and Portugal" (2012). Government and
International Affairs Faculty Publications. 7.
http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/gia_facpub/7
B. Reiter                                                                                  Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 
Framing Non-Whites and Producing Second-Class Citizens 
in France and Portugal 
 
Bernd Reiter  
 
 
The quality of contemporary democracies hinges on the breadth and depth of the 
citizenship regimes on which democracy ultimately rests. This article argues that, 
to assess citizenship, two important dimensions are of crucial interest, namely to 
what extent formal citizens are able to live and practice substantive citizenship 
roles and, secondly, how access to citizenship rights is used by different societal 
groups in order to defend privilege. Having conducted a comparative case study 
of Portugal and France, I now argue that political elites are contributing to a 
framing of non-whites as foreigners and immigrants because it serves their 
purpose and that of the majority of their electorate. I also demonstrate how 
academia contributes to this framing, as many scholars seem unable to free 
themselves from biased academic traditions, some of which are clearly racist.  
 
Keywords: Portugal; France; Citizenship; Racism; Minorities 
 
 
 
Introduction: Second-Class Citizenship 
 
Civilization has not yet fully recovered from the shock of its birth—the transition from the 
tribal or ‘closed society’ with its submission to magical forces, to the ‘open society’, which 
sets free the critical powers of man. […] the shock of this transition is one of the factors that 
have made possible the rise of those reactionary movements, which have tried, and still try, 
to overthrow civilization and return to tribalism (Karl Popper 1962) 
 
In recent years, the discourse about democracy has shifted from a focus on 
transition, to consolidation, and lately on the quality of democracy (O’Donnell 
et.al. 2004). Most authors follow the path-breaking work of T.H. Marshall (1992 
[1950]) and focus on citizenship rights as a way to assess democratic quality 
(e.g. Hagopian 2007). Others, more specific, argue that we need to take a close 
look at civil rights in order to determine the quality of democracy (Fischer 2008; 
Holston 2008). This focus on civil rights has significantly added to our 
understanding of what is wrong with democracies deemed to be ‘wanting’ or 
‘missing something’. However, the almost exclusive focus on rights has led our 
view away from the original meaning of citizenship, composed not just of rights, 
but also of responsibilities. In addition, this discourse on rights has furthered an 
understanding that, as citizens, we are entitled to a set of rights and has led 
many to discuss how far these rights should stretch—for example, whether or not 
they should include social and cultural rights (Young 1990).  
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I argue that an exclusive focus on citizenship as a set of rights is misguided and 
analytically not helpful. I agree with Dworkin (1978), who argues that the only 
right we have is that of equal treatment. Citizenship consists of rights and 
responsibilities, where rights are not entitlements, but certain collectively 
enforced protections and guarantees. Furthermore, citizenship consists of duties 
towards the collective which, in a democratic regime, translates into 
responsibilities towards the rules and contents of democracy. Accepting this 
broader definition of citizenship allows us to better assess the quality of 
democracy by analysing the quality of its citizenship—in terms both of rights and 
of responsibilities.  
By broadening the focus towards rights and responsibilities, we are able to 
compare a broader spectrum of democracies along a greater scale of indicators. 
Although some more-consolidated democracies have been able to guarantee a 
broad set of rights to their citizens, they score low when it comes to citizen 
responsibilities. Others, typically of the less-developed world, have been unable 
to guarantee rights, but they demand—and can sometimes count on—high 
degrees of citizen action and participation, which significantly adds to an active 
citizenship and thus to citizenship responsibility (Avritzer 2009).  
Typical scenarios also include a separation, among the citizenry, between 
those who have rights and those who have responsibilities. Some privileged 
groups have been able to secure rights without sharing in the responsibilities; 
other groups have been left with responsibilities, without having access to the 
same rights (most notoriously in the case of women, non-traditional citizens and 
minorities). The distinction of who has rights and who does not—as well as the 
related differentiation between those on whose responsibilities the state relies, 
and those who avoid these responsibilities—is highly consequential. Citizenship 
status, ethnicity, class and gender, have been used to divide citizenry into those 
with and those without rights, and those with and those without responsibilities. 
 
Substantive Citizenship as a Social Role and Relational Asset 
 
In his seminal work entitled Citizenship and Social Class, Marshall 
(1992[1950]) argued that, in Europe, civil rights preceded political rights and 
that, once both these rights were achieved, social rights would follow. 
Marshall predicted that the twentieth century would see an expansion of 
social rights which he defined as ‘the whole range from the right to a 
modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full in 
the social heritage and to live the life of a civilized being according to the 
standards prevailing in society. The institutions most closely connected with 
it are the educational system and the social services’ (Marshall 1992[1950]: 
8). For him, the state was called upon to reduce the risks associated with 
capitalism for the poorest citizens, state action which would lead to an 
‘overarching sense of community and civilization’ (Jones and Gaventa 2002: 
3). 
When the twentieth century came to an end, it became clear that 
Marshall’s prediction was too optimistic. In 2009, many European citizens 
are effectively still excluded from social rights, to the point where some 
analysts argue that Europe is developing an apartheid system (Balibar 
2004). Non-traditional, non-white European citizens, in particular, see their 
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civil rights curbed by the forces of prejudice and racism. In many countries 
they are treated as foreigners and intruders despite their legal citizenship 
(Rosello 2001). Instead of social rights following civil and political rights, it 
rather appears that the exercise of civil rights depends on the previous 
achievement of social rights, as racism is undermining the effectiveness of 
civil and political rights of all those stigmatised as ‘Others Within’. 
Racism is at the core of this exclusion and it is Marshall’s underestimation 
of the power of racism that led him to formulate overly optimistic predictions 
about Europe’s democratic future. In Europe, as elsewhere, racism 
continues to be functional for the maintenance and reproduction of privilege. 
Worse, with the increased market competition characteristic of advanced 
capitalist systems, the importance of racism might grow. Racism becomes 
more pronounced when different actors compete for scarce, and thus highly 
desirable, goods (Winant 2001). Under such conditions, whiteness functions 
as an additional capital, bestowing competitive advantages on those able to 
claim it with success (Reiter 2009). 
Citizenship is a broad concept. According to Webster’s definition, it is ‘the 
status of being a citizen’. Marshall (1992[1950]: 18), in turn, defines citizenship as 
‘a status bestowed on those who are full members of a community. All who 
possess the status are equal with respect to the rights and duties with which 
the status is endowed’. Tom Bottomore, who wrote the essay ‘Forty Years 
On’ which, together with Marshall’s own essay, comprises the publication 
through which Marshall’s work is accessible (1992), already points out that 
citizenship ‘in our days’ (his were the days of the 1990s) faces new 
challenges, some of which Marshall could not have foreseen. Among others, 
he mentions the problems triggered by increased migration, which thus 
cause greater ethnic heterogeneity among European citizenry and pose new 
challenges to citizenship. To capture these new challenges, Bottomore 
proposes a distinction between formal and substantive citizenship—a 
distinction introduced by Brubaker (1989, 1992). He quotes Brubaker, who 
had argued that ‘Formal citizenship is neither a sufficient, nor a necessary 
condition for substantive citizenship’ (Brubaker, quoted in Bottomore 1992: 66).  
Several authors have disputed the notion of citizenship as a status. For 
communitarians such as Sandel (1998), citizenship, more than a right, is an 
obligation and a calling to participate and actively engage in one’s 
community. Civic republicans such as Habermas (1998) have stressed that 
what makes one a citizen is the ability to participate in collective decision-
making and thus to fulfill one’s role as an active constituent of popular 
sovereignty. According to Jones and Gaventa, ‘At the centre of much 
contemporary writing is the need to conceptualize citizenship as both a 
status, which accords a range of rights and obligations and an active 
practice’ (2002: 5). Since then, others have tried to expand the notion of 
citizenship and have proposed alternative ways of conceptualisation. 
Somers, for example, has defined citizenship as ‘a set of institutionally 
embedded social practices’ (1993: 589). More-recent treatments of 
citizenship—e.g. those collected in Tulchin and Ruthenberg (2007)—follow 
this focus on citizenship as a practice. Holston proposes ‘to study the full 
experience of citizenship, and not only its political aspect’ (2007). In his book 
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Insurgent Democracy, Holston (2008) indeed applies an anthropological 
framework to the analysis of how citizenship is experienced in everyday life.  
However, these recent efforts to adequately capture and explain what 
citizenship effectively is and what it means to different people have not yet 
produced a conclusive framework and Hagopian’s (2007) call to focus on 
citizenship, especially when studying such ‘disjunctive democracies’ (Holston 
2008), where political and civil rights do not necessarily go hand-in-hand, still 
stands. 
To define citizenship, we therefore first need a useful analytical framework—a 
lens that allows us to focus on and delineate what the word ‘citizenship’ stands 
for. I propose to accept Brubaker’s distinction of formal and substantive 
citizenship and, in this article, further elaborate on the meaning of 
substantive citizenship. What exactly is substantive citizenship and how can 
we, as social researchers, assess it? Substantive citizenship, I propose, has 
two important dimensions: as a social role and as a relational asset. 
Indicating the relative presence or absence, as well as the quality of 
possession, on both dimensions allows us to gain a deeper, more specific, 
more precise and hence more accurate and valid, capturing of the empirical 
reality represented by the concept of citizenship.  
Hence, I propose that the concept of citizenship and the rights associated 
with it have two important dimensions as yet unexplored, or rather, not yet 
applied systematically to the study of democracy. First, citizenship is not just 
a legal status; it needs to be a practical and practiced reality for it to have 
any impact on people’s lives. As such, citizenship is associated with the role 
of being a citizen invested with certain rights and duties and protected by the 
state that makes and enforces the rules and laws that define citizenship. 
Citizenship, then, is best understood as a social role, as Brazilian 
anthropologist da Matta (1987) has long pointed out, and Holston (2008) has 
more recently highlighted again. If some citizens are not treated as citizens, 
citizenship remains an empty concept. Second, citizenship is also an asset 
and, just like any other asset, it is disputed. As an asset, the value of 
substantive citizenship is relational, i.e. its value is derived from how much 
substantive citizenship one person or group has, compared to another 
person or group. Having access to the asset of citizenship when most people 
do not, bestows extra value onto its possession.1 Treating citizenship as a 
relational asset implies that its unequal distribution divides the citizenry, and 
privileges those able to claim more citizenship than others and, through this 
process, secure tangible advantages for themselves.  
Seen in this light, the widely used concept of exclusion gains a more 
precise meaning— exclusion from having full access to citizenship rights and 
being able to fully live the role of a citizen. This exclusion, then, is mirrored 
by the inclusion of all those who are able to claim citizenship roles for 
themselves, using this access as a tool to defend privilege and perceiving 
the roles as entitlements.  
 
France: Double Standards 
 
In France, republican traditions of universal rights and liberties have dominated 
official political discourse since the French revolution. After the breakout of 
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minority youth riots in early November 2005, Prime Minister Villepin asserted that 
‘France is not a country like others. It will never accept that citizens live 
separately, with different opportunities and with unequal futures’.2 The way the 
French state seeks to ensure equal opportunities is guided by its commitment to 
the republican ideas of citoyenneté and intégration, which point to assimilation as 
the only way to integrate immigrants and non-traditional citizens into the nation. 
The core of this philosophy is to not recognise differences among French citizens 
and to apply colour-blind public policies to ensure equal opportunity.  
However, the assertion of the French Prime Minister is in stark contrast to a 
French reality that has been depicted by many as increasingly separate, 
where people of different ethnic backgrounds encounter very different 
opportunities and face highly disparate futures (Balibar 2004). France has 
become a showcase and example for a more-dominant European policy of 
not recognising ethnic groups and minorities and focusing on assimilation as 
the main, and indeed only, way to integrate immigrants. Officially, once a 
citizen, the French state does not take account of any group-specific 
characteristics that de facto set the citizenry apart, such as ethnicity, religion 
or gender. The French state therefore insists on a form of radical 
individualism that is anchored in political liberalism and classical 
republicanism. This model is dominant all over continental Europe and the 
importance of understanding the French way of officially denying the very 
existence of minorities therefore extrapolates the borders of the Fifth 
Republic.  
In real life, the distinction of insider/outsider that regulates national 
belonging and the distribution of rights is negotiated through the construction 
of a racialised conception of community. Nationalist political groups 
rediscover and disseminate a myth of ‘purity’, detecting ‘foreign’ elements 
that ‘contaminate’ the national body. Thus, whereas French political elites 
insist on not officially recognising any minorities within the national body, 
cultural, ethnic and religious differences are routinely recognised in everyday 
interactions and are extremely consequential. In a survey conducted in 2007 
by SOFRES—‘the most renowned and largest market-research firm in 
France’ (Tin 2008: 36)—a total of 3.86 per cent of adults interviewed self-
declared as ‘black’. Of those, 56 per cent declared that they had 
experienced racism in their everyday lives.3 Research has further 
demonstrated that young blacks (classified in the surveys as second-
generation Maghrebins and sub-Saharan Africans) are 2.5 times more likely 
to be unemployed than their white counterparts, which means that their 
unemployment rate hovers at around 20 per cent. Although non-whites also 
drop out of school more often than whites, their difficulty in finding jobs 
remains, even when compared to whites with the same qualifications 
(Silberman et al. 2007).  
The racist and exclusionary practices responsible for this situation are not 
hard to decipher as anxious responses of traditional, white residents towards 
a changing environment. As noted above, white French benefit from the 
exclusion of non-whites, especially on the job market, where high 
unemployment also affects them. Given the evidence of discrimination and 
unequal treatment affecting French citizenry depending on their skin colour 
and religion, how can we explain that the French state insists on not 
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providing statistics that capture these inequalities? Established practices 
around the job market provide a first clue: it is common practice in France, 
as elsewhere in Europe, for curricula vitae to contain information about the 
age of the applicant, as well as a photo. The black French citizens I 
interviewed in 2007 had all experienced similar situations when applying for 
a job—their candidacy advanced up to the moment when it became obvious 
that they were black.  
The statement of one black female interviewee—age 28, holder of a 
university degree, born in France and a French citizen—was typical. She 
explains (after my question regarding situations where racism was the most 
influential):  
 
At work, especially when you apply for a job. At job interviews, I would always be 
asked where I was from. I am French, but to them, it doesn’t appear that way 
(interview Rouen, 26 February 2007). 
 
On average, the black French citizens I interviewed in 2007, all of whom 
held university degrees and were French citizens, took about three years to 
finally find a job. In most cases, they found jobs that did not meet their 
expectations—a finding confirmed by more-systematic research (Simon 
2003). 
The French state thus demands or at least tolerates the fact that job 
applicants need to give evidence of their skin colour when applying for work, 
fully aware that this will significantly (and probably negatively) impact on 
their chances. In other words, French political elites and the state they 
command are aware that traditional white French citizens routinely 
discriminate against non-whites and non-Christians, a conclusion that is 
further evidenced by the long history of half-hearted and thus ineffective 
measures taken by the state to at least formally address this issue (Kiwan 
2007). But those same elites avoid taking any concrete and effective action 
to counteract this situation with reference to the ideal of universalism, 
laïcism and republicanism, although all of these ideals were formulated 
precisely to ensure equality, brotherhood and liberty. So why have political 
elites in France not acted more decisively to ensure the quality of their 
democracy and the upholding of the high principles it represents? The most 
plausible answer, it appears, is that they do not want to. Prohibiting the 
excluded from using cultural, ethnic and religious criteria to address 
inequalities while, at the same time, allowing employers to use ethnic criteria 
in their hiring practices, reveals the deep bias with which political elites 
address this issue. The conclusion reached by Louis-Georges Tin, black 
activist and founder of Cran, an umbrella organisation for black associations 
in France, seems the most plausible:  
 
I must note that the fierce adversaries of communities, as a matter of fact, were not 
against communities as such; they were against some communities: Arab-Muslims, 
Jews, and homosexuals […] no one criticizes the sixteenth arrondissement in Paris, a 
bourgeois community which also has its particular habits, mores, and customs. No 
one would dream of criticizing the traditional communities, professional communities, 
and the Catholic communities (Tin 2008: 38). 
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French political elites know about the discriminatory practices that 
victimise a part of the French citizenry yet they do not act decisively to 
resolve them. Instead, they hold on to the rhetoric of universalism, even 
though its aim is also to ensure equal rights for all. French citizenship has, 
as a consequence of persistent discrimination, become racialised and 
divided. Whereas traditional white citizens insist on their citizenship rights, 
thus treating them as assets and entitlements, ethnicised non-traditional 
minorities have become second-class citizens who are not allowed to 
experience the full extent of their role. To them, citizenship is not a set of 
entitlements but an unfulfilled promise. 
It is not surprising that people seek to defend privilege, especially if 
unmerited, and when it promises to secure concrete and very important 
advantages—for example, on a very competitive job market. It is, however, 
the responsibility of political elites and state apparatuses to check these 
tendencies and enact policies that aim to ensure equal opportunities—the 
core of the universalist idea. Instead, French political elites are assisting 
white citizens to defend their racial privileges, thus revealing profound 
double standards. If the French state is so sternly against any form of 
particularism, then the ethnic marking of applicants on their curricula vitae 
should be illegal, especially considering its highly consequential effects on 
(universalist) equal opportunities. Racist bias in hiring would also have to be 
addressed in other ways in order to ensure equal chances, for example by 
enacting quotas. Furthermore, if state elites were really committed to 
achieving universal equality, they would not rob those negatively affected by 
discriminatory practices of the means to address them. They do this by not 
allowing a diagnosis of the current situation of the French citizenry—that 
takes account of inequalities—in the form of colour-conscious censuses. 
French political elites, however, have not done anything to effectively 
counteract the racist practices of traditional white citizens. This reluctance 
can only be explained by remembering the benefits that political elites and 
their electorate reap from the current situation: it provides the white majority 
with a competitive advantage on the job market, allows state elites to escape 
scrutiny and shields them from being held responsible for the wide array of 
social problems facing French society by blaming Others. 
 
Portugal: Others into Foreigners 
 
Portuguese society is increasingly heterogeneous, although there are no data on 
how heterogeneous its population truly is, as the Portuguese state follows the 
French model of not differentiating between its citizens. However, cities such as 
Lisbon count on a significant population of non-white citizens who go to school 
with, and compete for jobs against, the dominant white population. After 
examining the role of state elites in the creation and maintenance of a racist 
common sense that leads to racialised conceptions of first- and second-class 
citizenship, the case of Portugal allows us to shed light on the implication of 
academia in this maintenance which frames non-whites as foreigners and 
immigrants, while deciding who ‘fits in’ based on ethnic background. I present two 
arguments here to elucidate this phenomenon: first, the fact that there are almost 
no studies on blacks in Portugal, despite their visibility in cities like Lisbon and 
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Porto; and second, the fact that some immigrants—those labelled ‘home-comers’ 
or retornados—are much more welcome and taken care of than others, an 
attribute with strong racial undertones.  
The literature about blacks in Portugal or on the situation of minorities there is 
scarce, and there are almost no publications on the topic.4 Instead, it is very 
common to read that ‘Portugal is a fundamentally homogeneous country in terms 
of ethnicity and language, and also as regards religious faith’ (Freire 2007: 208). 
This goes against all the empirical evidence from Lisbon when we know from 
research that ‘legally settled foreigners represent around 5 per cent of the 
resident population’ (Marques et al. 2007: 1149). Furthermore, research on 
education by these same authors who, in 2004, conducted a case study in the 
municipality of Oeiras, Greater Lisbon, allows us to deduce the degree of 
heterogeneity that characterises contemporary Lisbon society. Marques et al. 
found that, among their sample of Oeiras schoolchildren aged 14 to 24, ‘44.3 per 
cent [were] […] children of immigrants’ (2007: 1156). At the same time, articles 
and books about immigrants abound, thus creating the false impression that 
Portugal has indeed an immigration problem, but not a problem of ensuring equal 
opportunities to its diverse citizenry. 
So what kind of scholarly blindness allows social scientists to state that 
Portugal is a fundamentally homogeneous country? It appears that the lack of 
statistics on the presence and situation of minorities among the Portuguese 
citizenry has become a self-fulfilling prophecy. By focusing academic production 
on foreigners and immigrants while, at the same time, not producing any 
information on the number of minorities, let alone on their socio-economic 
situation, Portuguese scholars help to perpetuate a common sense that says 
‘Portuguese citizens are white; non-whites are foreigners and immigrants’. Similar 
to the French case, the interest behind such manoeuvering is quite evident: real 
problems remain unexamined and important questions unaddressed; political 
elites escape scrutiny by shifting the blame onto others, which allows them to 
continue in their malpractices; whites, perceived as ‘normal citizens’, benefit from 
the bedeviling of non-whites and reap tangible benefits.  
In the case of Portugal, where funding for scholarly work in the social sciences 
is scarce and almost 100 per cent comes directly from different state agencies or 
from the state-owned Foundation for Science and Technology (FCT), it becomes 
clear that intellectual elites depend on state elites for the funding of their research 
projects (http://alfa.fct.mctes.pt/estatisticas/global). The fact that there are so few 
studies on ethnic minorities, especially blacks, in Portugal thus cannot be 
interpreted as a coincidence. To the contrary, the only two possible explanations 
for this omission are that (a) the state does not fund such studies, or (b) that 
Portuguese researchers do not propose any projects about Portuguese ethnic 
diversity in relation to equal opportunities and questions of justice. Both 
possibilities seem plausible and deserve further scrutiny. For the sake of my 
study, it is enough to point to the inherent conservativism and inertia of scientific 
research programmes, favoring research projects that are within already 
established paradigms. This tendency complicates the emergence of new 
research projects that are unconnected to already-established truths and the 
methods, units of analyses, and research questions associated with them (Kuhn 
1996; Popper 2002). Scholars thus share in the responsibility of perpetuating the 
invisibility of ethnic minorities in Portuguese society—which, in turn, contributes 
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to the perpetuation of their situation of exclusion and second-class citizenship 
status. 
According to the extremely scarce information available, second-generation 
immigrants (a doubtful denomination in itself), fare much worse in school 
compared to their white counterparts. Marques et al. found that ‘Africans have 
gained the status of “the most visible minority”. Surveys show that they are more 
prone to be perceived as immigrants than any other category […] They are still 
the least welcome in close family relations’. They also found that ‘nearly three 
quarters of students with Cape Verdean ancestry experienced grade blockage at 
least once’ (Marques et al. 2007: 1149, 1160). In other words, 75 per cent of 14–
24-year-old students in Oeiras with a Cape Verdean background repeat a year at 
least once before they graduate from High School!  
‘In Oeiras, we found that around a third of the Portuguese students have to 
repeat a school year at least once, compared to 41 per cent for native-born 
children of immigrant parentage and 51 per cent for the foreign-born’ (Marques et 
al. 2007: 1158). There are also extreme differences among ‘native-born children 
of immigrant parentage’ and those born to traditional Portuguese residents with 
regard to early school determination, despite the fact that the majority of 
Portuguese students (77 per cent, according to Marques et al. 2007) aspire to 
attend university. Hortas (2008) confirms these findings, at least indirectly, when 
stating that ‘When we look at immigrant dropout/failure, we see that the rates are 
triple the norm in primary school, and double for the other cycles’ (2008: 423). 
The use of such extremely cumbersome designations as ‘native-born children 
of immigrant parentage’ hints at the difficulties that Portuguese scholars face 
when discussing this issue. When reading through the available educational 
statistics and the research conducted in this field, it appears that what 
schoolchildren who face above average dropout and repetition rates indeed 
share is not their legal status but the colour of their skin. They are all non-white 
and, even though Portuguese is their first language, they perform significantly 
worse than their white Portuguese colleagues and even white EU immigrants 
(Marques et al. 2007). In other words white foreigners, whose first language is 
not Portuguese, by far outperform black Portuguese schoolchildren whose first 
language is Portuguese. 
The relative absence of studies about the socio-economic situation of 
Portuguese minorities, especially blacks, and the cumbersome treatment and 
reluctance with which they are treated together with the high profile of studies 
that focus on immigrants, all help to consolidate the already wide-spread 
common sense that transforms black Portuguese citizens into foreigners. The 
statement of an interviewee illustrates this state of affairs: 
 
I am a Portuguese citizen but at the same time I am not a Portuguese citizen. I have all the 
rights, but at the same time, I have none. I have even represented Portugal at international 
events, while I was a student. But because of my colour, I am not treated as a citizen. I 
constantly experience discrimination at all levels: social, cultural, economic … I compete in 
the job market against Portuguese classmates who had worse grades, but they get the job.5  
 
Who counts as a national and who does not thus has severe consequences on 
life-chances in both France and Portugal—no matter the citizenship status. 
“Nationals must be white”—informs the common sense—a common sense that 
obfuscates all the inequalities and injustices to which non-white citizens are 
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routinely exposed, while at the same time securing privileges to white citizens, 
and relieving political elites of their responsibility to ensure justice and equality 
among their citizenry—the cornerstones of democracy. After all, ‘Blacks do not 
belong here’ and, perceived as foreigners, are not a concern of political elites and 
the white majorities they represent. 
 
Ties to the Motherland: Of Remittances and Returners 
 
A final piece of empirical evidence of the construction of extremely biased racial 
regimes in Portugal is provided by the curious case of the so-called ‘home-
comers’ or retornados—white African immigrants who settled in Portugal mostly 
between 1974 and 1975. When Portugal’s African colonies achieved 
independence in 1974, many white colonisers ran the risk of losing their 
privileges and maybe even their properties and lives, and some 800,000 decided 
to move to Portugal. These white home-comers encountered such a welcoming 
and open Portugal that the whole experience was widely praised as a ‘great 
success story’ of integration (e.g. by Pires 2003). The willingness of the 
Portuguese society and state to accommodate these immigrants went so far as to 
alter a long-established legal tradition—the naturalisation law—which, since 1981 
and in order to accommodate the returning colonisers now gone astray, was 
changed from jus soli to jus sanguini. After the changes of 1981, a child born to a 
Portuguese parent automatically becomes a Portuguese citizen, provided the 
parent was born in Portugal or in a territory administered by the Portuguese 
state.6 
Since 1981, Portugal thus welcomes all those able to claim Portuguese 
ancestry while, at the same time, blocking the integration of all those without it. 
Through this manoeuvre, returners were not considered as immigrants. The 
success of this re-integration, according to Pinheiro, was due to the fact that ‘this 
biographical particularity of this community is not visible in Portuguese society’ 
(Pinheiro 2008: 66). Read: They were white. Pinheiro continues: ‘With the 
retornados also came approximately 28,000 Africans, both refugees from the civil 
wars in Angola and Mozambique and working immigrants from all former 
colonies. Unlike the retornados, this African community had no special 
connection to Portugal or Portuguese nationality since they came from 
independent states’ (2008: 67)—no connection other than having worked for the 
Portuguese colonial empire and, as a consequence of betting on the wrong side, 
having lost a home in the newly independent African states, one might add. 
Indeed, a significant number of this early group of Africans most probably held 
Portuguese passports, because they had worked on the side of the colonisers, 
helping to control and administer the ‘natives’, a fact that can easily be verified by 
interviewing this population. Indeed, as Marques et al. (2007) indicate, some of 
these ‘returners’ have lived in Africa for generations. The maintenance of cultural 
ties to the colonial motherland has proved extremely consequential to them so 
that, in contemporary Portugal, the divisions created under colonial rule between 
colonial subjects and colonisers still plague intra- and inter-ethnic relations 
(Reiter 2008). It also seems legitimate to deduce that the dual labour market that 
determines the opportunities available to African migrants and their descendents, 
diagnosed by Eaton (2001), can in part be explained by the relation of different 
African-descent groups to the Portuguese colonial state. In an interview 
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conducted in 2003, the president of the Lisbon-based Cape Verdean association, 
Ms. Alestina Tolentino, explained: 
 
After independence, many Cape Verdeans settled in Portugal. They were Cape Verdean 
nationals, but they had worked for the Portuguese state in Cape Verde. As such, they had 
acquired certain rights, pensions, social security, and such, which they had because they 
were Portuguese citizens. So when all these returners arrived in Portugal after 
independence, among them were many Cape Verdeans. They were highly qualified 
because they had worked for the Portuguese colonial apparatus […] The face of colonialism 
for many Angolans and Mozambicans was not Portuguese, but Cape Verdean. 
 
Most returners moved to Portugal because of the links they had forged during 
colonial times, when they had a direct connection to the colonising state 
apparatus. Once in Portugal, they could count on pensions and social security 
schemes. They felt, and most of them also officially were, Portuguese citizens 
and all those who were not would become so after 1981. If they were Cape 
Verdean nationals, they would still fit the racial regime that was created during 
colonial times and then employed to construct social hierarchies in Portugal, as 
most Cape Verdeans are easily distinguishable from Angolans and Mozambicans 
by their lighter skin colour. 
As Reiter (2008: 403), explains: 
 
Under the indigenous law code that regulated life in most of the Portuguese world until 1961, 
some natives could become Portuguese citizens if they passed the ‘civilization-test’, 
consisting of demonstrating their degree of assimilation to European values and manners. 
The Indigenous Code of 1954 regulated the stages that led from being ‘indigenous’ to 
becoming ‘civilized’, making the achievement of European manners and habits the 
benchmark for gaining access to Portuguese citizenship rights. Assimilated Portuguese 
citizens had to demonstrate that they had left their ‘native savagery’ behind. Successful 
assimilation had to be proven through Portuguese language skills, clothing style, food 
habits, and other western civilized manners. 
 
After 1974, Portuguese state elites thus ‘took care of theirs’ and, in so doing, 
made sure that uncivilised Others could not slip in.  
However, the maintenance of bonds with individuals and groups who have 
connections to the motherland is a not uncomplicated matter, especially for 
Portugal, a country that had long argued its intimate closeness to its colonial 
subjects. Portuguese settlements in Brazil, Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, 
Goa, Macao, South Africa and Cape Verde reach back to the sixteenth century. 
The Portuguese presence never effectively ended with independence, so that 
most of the former colonies still have a sizeable Portuguese population. By the 
late 1990s, the economic boom that was caused by Portugal joining the EU and 
receiving millions of EU funds to improve infrastructure started to slow down and 
unemployment began to rise. During that time the first studies about remittances 
emerged. From the late 1990s onward, remittances declined steadily from 3 per 
cent of GNP in 1990 to 2.5 per cent by the end of the decade.7  
While colonial ties seemed to presume that Portugal would take care of all 
those who had helped to sustain the colonial apparatus by facilitating their 
integration into the Portuguese state, it became clear by the late 1990s that 
Portugal could not welcome all those communities that upheld their Portuguese 
nationality. Under these new economic circumstances, and equipped with hard 
evidence about the magnitude and importance of remittances for the Portuguese 
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economy, Portuguese political elites shifted gear. They realised that it was no 
longer desirable to ‘bring home’ all the former colonisers or those who had 
passed the ‘civilisation test’ and could count on national solidarity, based on their 
white skin or their white habits. While it still seemed important to maintain the 
bonds that united these exiled communities to the motherland—the sine-qua-non 
conduction to ensure that remittances continued to flow ‘home’—it also seemed 
important to ensure that these exiles stayed where they were, rather than further 
burdening the Portuguese labour market.  
Political elites found the solution to these new challenges of the late 1990s in 
the Camões Institute. Since 2000, new Camões Cultural Centers were 
established in Paris and in Poitiers (France), Dakar (Senegal), Windhoek 
(Namibia), Dili (East Timor), Hamburg (Germany), Stockholm (Sweden) 
andVienna (Austria), as well as in the headquarters of the African Union in Addis 
Ababa (Ethiopia) and of the Economic Community of West African States in 
Abuja (Nigeria). Portuguese Language Centers were opened in Canchungo, 
Ongoré, Mansoa, Bafatá, Gabú, Buba, Catió, Bolama, Bubaque, and Quinhamel, 
all in Guinea Bissau, to spread the use of Portuguese as the official language in 
the country. Taken together, since 1998 the Portuguese state has opened 19 
language centres and is now present in 20 cities in different countries. According 
to Malheiros (2002), ‘Portugal's Ministry of Foreign Affairs has registered and 
attempts to maintain ties with nearly 4.3 million Portuguese and people with 
Portuguese ancestry living abroad’.8 In 2007, the Camões Institute, together with 
the Lisbon-based Instituto Superior de Ciências do Trabalho e Empresa (ISCTE) 
determined that the Portuguese language contributed 17 per cent to the 
Portuguese GDP.9 
Portuguese political elites have thus found a way to categorise their citizens 
into those who can live in Portugal and those who are more functional if and 
when they stay abroad but send their money home to their families. Neither are 
all passport-holders welcome in the motherland—as the situation of all those who 
hold passports, but are treated as foreigners, demonstrates. Conversely, others 
have been received with open arms, and laws have been changed to 
accommodate them. The racial project that informs this categorising of people 
and groups into ‘desirable’ and ‘less-desirable’ is hard to overlook. Yet most 
Portuguese scholars do just that—be it because they cannot find funding for 
projects that would raise these issues, or because they are too caught up in a 
hegemonic common sense that has long accepted that non-whites are not 
Portuguese and thus cannot count on the solidarity of the national community. In 
so doing, Portuguese academia becomes implicated in the reproduction of a 
racialised common sense that legitimises the maintenance of a racialised social 
order, dividing the Portuguese citizenry into first- and second-class citizens. 
Whereas the white (biological or culturally defined) first-class citizens can count 
on citizenship rights as entitlements, second-class citizens have not been allowed 
to live the lives of citizens. The ‘asset’ nature of citizenship becomes evident, as 
all those benefiting from such a system have no reason to change it—and 
instead have every reason to hold the ‘Others’ out. 
 
Conclusion: Framing Non-Whites and Producing Second-Class Citizens 
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An ethnically defined nationalism has become the norm in Western Europe. 
Although its emergence can be explained by the late-state formation of some EU 
member-states, such as Germany (Hobsbawm 2003), other states—such as 
France or Portugal—have only recently shifted away from (in the case of 
Portugal) or restricted the reach of (in the case of France) the jus soli rules that 
have long been a cornerstone of their democracies. The contemporary strength 
of ethnic nationalism must thus be seen as the result of deliberate political action 
aimed at redrawing the rules of belonging. 
Ethnic nationalism, however, not only perpetuates the exclusion of non-whites 
by defining them as not belonging to the national community; it also stands in the 
way of the country achieving truly universal citizenship and democracy with 
strong civil, political and social components. The persistence and even growth of 
ethnic nationalism is the root of many of the problems which Europe faces today, 
because it competes with the development of civic bonds among an increasingly 
heterogeneous European citizenry.  
A complication to this problem is caused by the commonly almost exclusive 
focus on citizenship rights, to the detriment of citizenship duties and 
responsibilities. Ethnically defined nationalism, coupled with a widely held belief 
that citizenship is a matter of rights without responsibilities and duties, has 
created a situation where ethnic white Europeans arrogantly insist on their ‘rights’ 
as citizens—thus presenting them as entitlements while conveniently overlooking 
their responsibilities towards their fellow citizens. Instead, minority citizens get 
routinely blamed for every and all the economic, social and political problems that 
many European countries have experienced over the last decades. 
The lack of a focus on civic solidarity and of a civically defined European 
membership is also at the core, I would contend, of the oft-times awkward 
difficulties many European states and societies have when dealing with anti-
democratic elements in their midst. Instead of focusing on anti-democratic agents 
as the prime culprits of terror and insecurity, blame is commonly shifted away 
from civic matters towards cultural and ethnic ones—thus unduly blaming certain 
religions, cultures and ethnic groups for violent acts and ‘tendencies’, thus further 
perpetuating stereotypes about others.  
To make matters worse, several European states do not provide census data 
on the ethnic backgrounds of their citizens, justifying such a policy with reference 
to the principle of universal citizenship. Minority citizens thus have no way of 
knowing their numbers, situation or degree to which they have a shared destiny. 
By most accounts, having access to these numbers could prove explosive and is 
thus avoided by status-quo-oriented political elites. Parallel to not providing 
census information on European minorities, several European states actively 
fund a plethora of studies that focus exclusively on immigrants, thus anchoring 
public attention and discourse firmly on issues of foreigners and their problems of 
attaining legality and achieving integration. Academia has become implicated in 
the dissemination of a framework that almost automatically transforms all non-
whites into foreigners and immigrants. There is a clear lack of studies on an 
increasingly diverse European citizenry and the difficulties of non-white citizens in 
gaining acceptance, equal opportunities and equal treatment by the state and 
other—white—citizens. They have become second-class citizens who are not 
allowed to experience the full extent of the social role that comes with the status 
of being a citizen.  
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Broadly accepted racist practices support the marginalisation of non-white 
European citizens and expose them to discriminatory practices, and policies, the 
unchallenged reproduction of which provides evidence for the high degree to 
which such discrimination has been normalised. Extremely unjust racial regimes 
are thus being constructed and their victims are being robbed of the tools with 
which to face up to them effectively. 
The influence of European racial regimes becomes even more evident when 
considering how some migrants, namely ethnic whites, have been able to 
successfully escape the status of victims. Post-1974 white African immigrants to 
Portugal have successfully claimed the status of ‘returners’, which has allowed 
them to settle unproblematically in Portugal. In 1981 the Portuguese national 
assembly effectively passed a law restricting Portuguese citizenship to those of 
Portuguese descent—therefore shifting citizenship criteria from jus soli to jus 
sanguinis—in order to accommodate white ‘returners’ and facilitate their 
integration. But what criterion, if not ethnicity, makes one a ‘returner’?  
Ethnic nationalism thus is at the core of many problems of contemporary 
European states and societies. Instead of blaming immigrants, EU member-
states ought to make democracy its foundational element, and membership 
dependent on citizens’ willingness to actively support and defend democracy, 
which would imply a stronger focus on citizenship responsibilities. But political 
elites have successfully shifted the focus onto migrants and foreigners and made 
them the culprits of most of the social problems which European societies face 
today, allowing those same elites to avoid being blamed for the problems for 
which they are ultimately responsible. Scholars who, in their studies, focus 
excessively on immigrants and foreigners, further contribute to a hegemonic 
common sense that transforms non-whites into foreigners and intruders, thus 
supporting political elites in their manoeuvring and providing them with legitimacy. 
If anything, social scientists should produce more studies on failing and 
unresponsive states, inefficient bureaucracies, and the dearth of democratic 
institutions. They should also unveil more of the injustices and problems that a 
significant part of the European citizenry routinely faces. If they were to do so, we 
might be able to improve the current situation and work towards more just and 
inclusive democracies, which might also prove more economically efficient—at 
least if we believe the Nobel-price winning economist Amartya Sen (2000).  
 
Notes 
 
[1] It seems important to explain that my own interest in citizenship does not 
take issue with a whole set of arguments about what rights are and whether 
or not social reality can be influenced by such lofty concepts as citizenship 
rights or social rights. I am sceptical about the potential of laws to produce 
reality and aware of the pitfalls of legal idealism. Citizenship, here, thus 
does not refer to a set of entitlements. This article is instead concerned with 
the quality and the conditionalities that restrict the political, civil and social 
rights of certain individuals and groups within a citizenry. More precisely, I 
want to analyse how societal dynamics affect and condition the quality of 
citizenship. Marshall’s (1992[1950]) essay had a narrower interest—to 
analyse the relationship between citizenship and capitalism. He was thus 
able to see, that ‘the components of a civilized and cultured life, formerly 
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the monopoly of the few, were brought progressively within reach of the 
many, who were encouraged thereby to stretch out their hands towards 
those that still eluded their grasp. The diminution of inequality strengthened 
the demand for its abolition, at least with regard to the essentials of social 
welfare’(1992 [1950]: 37). 
[2] Quoted in John Thornhill, Financial Times, 8 November 2005. 
[3] TNS SOFRES (2007), survey results available online at 
http://lecran.org/?p=243. 
[4] A search in what is probably the most prestigious academic social-science 
journal published in Portugal, Analise Social, revealed that, between 2000 
and 2009, the journal published 20 articles focusing on migration, but only 
one on ethnic minorities. Published in 2005, Machado et al. analyse the 
effects of cultural differences on school performance. Notable exceptions to 
this tendency of Portuguese academia to render minorities invisible include 
the work of Fradique (2003), Contador (2001) and Marques et al. (2007). 
[5] Interview (my translation) conducted on 10 June 2003 in Lisbon (see Reiter 
2008: 409 for complete quote). 
[6] Article 1, which specifies original nationality, states that Portuguese by 
descent are all those born to a Portuguese mother or father in Portuguese 
territory or in a foreign country if the progenitor was living there and working 
for the Portuguese state as well as all those born in Portuguese territory or 
living there over 6 years and working for the Portuguese state who want to 
adopt Portuguese nationality. ARTIGO 1.º(Nacionalidade originária): 1—
São Portugueses de origem: a) Os filhos de pai português ou mãe 
portuguesa nascidos em território português ou sob administração 
portuguesa, ou no estrangeiro se o progenitor português aí se encontrar ao 
serviço do Estado Português; b) Os filhos de pai português ou mãe 
portuguesa nascidos no estrangeiro se declararem que querem ser 
portugueses ou inscreverem o nascimento no registo civil português; c) Os 
indivíduos nascidos em território português filhos de estrangeiros que aqui 
residam habitualmente há, pelo menos, seis anos não estejam ao serviço 
do respectivo Estado, se declararem que querem ser portugueses; d) Os 
indivíduos nascidos em território português quando não possuam outra 
nacionalidade. 2—Presumem-se nascidos em território português ou sob 
administração portuguesa, salvo prova em contrário, os recém-nascidos 
expostos naqueles territories. 
[7] Banco de Portugal (2006) Remittances in the Portuguese Balance of 
Payments. Luxembourg Group on Remittances, 26–7 June, online: 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sta/bop/2006/luxgrp/pdf/italy.pdf. 
[8] MPI: http://www.migrationinformation.org/feature/display.cfm?ID=77. 
[9] Jornal Publico, 21 January 2009. 
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